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RECENT DECISIONS
had been a party to the litigation.2 2 It has always been the policy
of New York to permit the insurer to interpose such defenses
"
.
2
Consequently, if the New York courts enforce direct action statutes
as interpreted by the courts of the encting jurisdictions, the strong
public policy of this state concerning the defenses available to the
insurer may be abrogated.
The direct action statute does have the advantage of preventing
collusion between the insured and his insurer. Therefore, the lack
of cooperation by the insured cannot defeat the right of the injured
party against the insurer. However, such protection is already
provided in New York's Insurance Law.24
If the insurer is permitted to interpose against the injured
party those defenses available against the insured, and if the pro-
cedural "safety valves" are provided to keep jury verdicts in their
proper perspective, deleterious implications to be drawn from the
instant case will be obviated. However, the possible loss of defenses
by the insurer, coupled with the fact that New York may be invit-
ing forum-shopping by providing a forum which will enforce direct
action statutes without procedural "safety valves," would seem to
indicate that the Court in the instant case did not reach a. wholly
satisfactory result.
LABOR LAW - SEcTIONS 8(a) (5) AND 9(a) - SUBCONTRACT-
ING ix AcCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PRACTICE HELD NoT
MANDATORY SUBJECT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.- Since the
1940's the respondent-employer, an appliance manufacturer, had
unilaterally subcontracted approximately four thousand jobs, all of
which could have been performed by his own employees. Although
the union had never challenged this custom, in 1963 it filed a
complaint with the National Labor Relations Board in which it
demanded the right to bargain concerning the employer's decision
to subcontract. In reversing the trial examiner, the National
Labor Relations Board held that subcontracting which merely con-
tinues a long established practice, without significantly changing
existing terms or conditions of employment, is not subject to man-
22West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950) (failure
of insured to cooperate not available as a defense against injured party).
Contra, Cespuglio v. Cespuglio, 238 Wis. 603, 300 N.W. 780 (1941).23 Roth v. National Auto. Mut. Cas. Co., 202 App. Div. 667, 195 N.Y.
Supp. 865 (1st Dep't 1922) ; Killeen v. General Acc. Assur. Corp., 131 Misc.
691, 227 N.Y. Supp. 220 (N.Y. County Ct. 1928).
24 Under New York law, the injured party can protect himself from
the insured's failure to give notice to his insurer by giving such notice him-
self. N.Y. Ixs. LAw § 167(1) (c).
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datory collective bargaining. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 150
N.L.R.B. No. 136 (1965).
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act' recognizes
the right of employees to bargain collectively. In fact, it is an
unfair labor practice under sections 8(a)(5)2 and 9(a)3 for an
employer to refuse to bargain with his employees' representatives
concerning any decision he makes "in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. .. .
Traditionally, the scope of these provisions was generally limited to
decisions in such areas as wages, hours, seniority, vacations and
union status.4  Gradually, however, the NLRB and the courts, in
construing these provisions, have greatly increased the areas in
which bargaining is required. For instance, it was decided in
NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co.5 that merit increases were proper
subjects for mandatory collective bargaining, as such increases form
an "integral part of the wage structure." 6 Employer decisions
affecting job reclassification7 and retirement age are also a subject
of collective bargaining since they affect "conditions of employ-
ment." Thus, in determining whether there is a duty to bargain
on a given subject, courts generally consider (1) whether the
matter in contention affects the employer-employee relationship 9
and (2) whether the matter in contention has a direct bearing on
the terms or conditions under which the employees work."
All decisions by management which may affect conditions of
employment do not require bargaining. Traditionally, management
has certain prerogatives which may be exercised without restriction.
These prerogatives included decisions concerning job content,"
size of the work force,12 prices' s and appointment of supervisory
'61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §157 (1958).
261 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958).
3 Cf. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958).
4 Cox and Dunlop, Regulation Of Collective Bargaining By The National
Labor Relations Board, 63 HAav. L. REv. 389, 401 (1950).
5 165 F2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948).6 1d. at 767.
7 See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 162 F.2d 435 (7th Cir.
1947).
8 See Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
9 See Detroit Resilient Floor Decorators Local 2265, 136 N.L.R.B.
769 (1962), aff'd, 317 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1963); W.W. Cross & Co. v.
NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949).
10 See, e.g., May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945);
Great So. Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 127 F.2d 180 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 652 (1942).
"1Woods, Mandatory Collective Bargaining, 6 HASrMGs L.J. 1, 14
(1954).
"2Feldman, The Right to Manage, 1 LAB. L.J. 287, 288-89 (1949).
13 Shreve, Objective: Industrial Peace, 1 IND. & LAB. REL. RE. 431
(1948).
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personnel. 4 Such decisions were considered management prero-
gatives because they concerned the efficiency and operational capacity
of the business and go to its very essence.' 5 In addition, the em-
ployer could increase his prerogatives by inserting a management
clause in his labor-management contract granting him the right to
decide a particular issue.
Recent developments, however, have significantly restricted the
subjects which appeared to be exclusively within the unilateral
decision-making powers of employers.' Where once the employer
had an absolute right to terminate his business operations, there
are indications that today he may not decide to do so without
first bargaining. 7  Furthermore, the NLRB has held that where
automation would adversely affect the employees' interests, the
employer is required to bargain with the union concerning both
his decision to change his method of .operation and the resulting
effects upon the conditions of employment.' s
Although the Board had traditionally required bargaining on
the effects of employer decisions in automation and plant-closing
cases, it was not until these recent holdings that the requirement
was extended to the decision itself. A comparison of plant-closing
cases illustrates this change. In 1953, in the case of Brown
Trucking & Trailer Mfg. Co., 9 the Board concerned itself only
with the effects of a decision to reduce plant operations. In that
case, the employer closed his plant and transferred his operations.
The NLRB found that the employer had violated Section 8(a) (5)
by failing to advise the union of the move, so that it could demand
the opportunity to bargain collectively concerning the adverse effects
on the employees. However, in 1963 the Board intimated that
the employer had indulged in an unfair labor practice by refusing
to offer the union an opportunity to bargain concerning his decision
to close the plant and move its operations. 0
14 Woods, supra note 11.
15 See, e.g., Union Drawn Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 587 (3d Cir.
1940); Ballston Stillwater Knitting Co. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 758 (2d Cir.
1938); NLRB v. Lion Shoe Co., 97 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1938). See also
Shreve, supra note 13.
16Rothman, The "Right" to Go Out of Business Together With A
Consideration of Plant Removal, Subcontracting And The Duty To Bargain
6 B.C. IND. & Cot. L. REv. 1 (1964).
'7 See Star Baby Co., 14 N.L.R.B. 678 (1963), modified, 334 F2d 601
(2d Cir. 1964).
Is Renton News Record, 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962).
'2 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).20Weingarten Food Center, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 256 (1962). See Rothman,
supra note 16. But see NLRB v. Darlington Mfg. Co. (U.S. March 29,
1965) in N.Y. Times, March 30, 1965, p. 1, col. 6, where the United States
Supreme Court held that an employer could close down his business entirely
to avoid dealing with a union, but not partly if the intent and effect is to
discourage unionism at his other plants.
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Paralleling these developments are those in the area of sub-
contracting. In this area the NLRB, in determining whether
subcontracting would require collective bargaining, had followed
two distinct lines of reasoning. For instance, in Timken Roller
Bearing Co.,21 the Board found that the employer had committed
an unfair labor practice by refusing to give the union an
opportunity to bargain on his decision to subcontract. In other
cases supporting this ruling,22 the Board declared that employees
have a right to bargain where a subcontracting decision would
affect the volume of work upon which their job security depends.
On the other hand, in such cases as Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp.,22 the Board had held that the union, although it could compel
the employer to bargain on the effects of a decision to subcontract,
lacked the right to demand that he bargain on the decision itself.
Hence, the diverse NLRB rulings had not settled the issue of
whether decisions to subcontract would be subject to mandatory
collective bargaining. Instead, the law concerning subcontracting
had been placed in a state of confusion.
The confusion rampant in Board decisions had not found its
way to the courts. Thus, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.,24 the courts had generally accepted
the latter view that all decisions to subcontract were management
prerogatives even though the labor-management contract did not
expressly reserve them to management. 25 In Fibreboard, however,
the Supreme Court followed the recent trend evidenced by the
latest NLRB decisions in plant-closing cases. In Fibreboard, two
months after the union had notified the employer of its decision
to bargain toncerning a modification of the existing contract
and four days before the contract terminated, the employer decided
to subcontract work performed by a certain unit of employees. By
so subcontracting, the employment of more than seventy workers
would be terminated. The employer's decision was found to be
motivated by the economic savings that would result from the
work force, fringe benefits and overtime benefits being reduced.26
Although his actions were motivated by sound economic con-
2170 N.L.R.B. 500, enforcement denied on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949
(6th Cir. 1947). See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558,
1562 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
22 Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), aff'd, 316 F.2d
846 (5th Cir. 1963); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550
(1962).
23 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1962).
24379 U.S. 203 (1964).
2 5 E.g., jays Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 292 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1961);
NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954).
26If the employer had manifested an animus towards the union, his
activity would have been set aside as violative of §8(a)(5). See, e.g.,
American Air Filter Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 939 (1960); Dearborn Oil & Gas
Corp., 125 N.L.R.B. 645 (1959); Annot. 152 A.L.R. 149 (1944).
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siderations, the Court found that the employer indulged in an
unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union on
his decision to subcontract. The Court reasoned that industrial
strife might be avoided if the em1l1oyer is obligated to bargain
in good faith concerning a decision to subcontract which results
directly in a termination of employment. Recognizing that this
reasoning could include all subcontracts, as well as all management
prerogatives, the Court restricted the case to its facts.2 7  Indeed,
the concurring opinion made this point extremely clear by rejecting
any implications which might flow from the majority ruling.28
Thus, Fibreboard appears to be limited to situations where the
employer terminates the employment of his workers by sub-
contracting work which had been previously performed by them.
The language of the Court, however, as well as the recent
indications that areas of decision once considered exclusive
management prerogatives are becoming required subjects for
collective bargaining, caused management to believe that there was
"no assurance that the majority . . . would not be willing in the
next case to follow the Board further along the path it has
charted." 29
The instant case is a step by the NLRB which should allay
these fears. It is consistent with, and gives meaning to, the
attitude manifested by the Supreme Court in Fibreboard. It does
this by refusing to lay down a hard and fast rule applicable
to all decisions involving subcontracts. In finding that sub-
contracting decisions which involve merely a "recurrent event in
a familiar pattern" are not subject to mandatory collective bar-
gaining, the Board noted that there was no direct effect on the
wages, or volume of work available to the employees. Thus the
Board concluded that management does not have to bargain on its
decision concerning the basic scope of the enterprise if there is
no immediate significant impact on the employees' wages, hours
or conditions of employment.
If the restrictive language of Fibreboard did not exist, how-
ever, the Board could have found in favor of the union. As the
trial examiner in Westinghouse pointed out, the subcontracting of
27 "We are thus not expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining to hold
. . . that the type of "contracting out" involved in this case . . . is a
statutory subject of collective bargaining under § 8(d)." Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964). Section 8(d)
of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1958), defines collective bargaining as the "performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer 'and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment. . .'28 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 27, at 217.29 Address by Francis A. O'Connell, Jr., Industrial Relations Society of
New York, January 21, 1965, in 58 L.R.R.M. 49, 51 (1965).
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work which would be performed by the employees impairs job
security since there is a loss not only of overtime benefits but of
work opportunities. In fact, eventually a point may be reached
where one job too many is subcontracted, resulting in the termin-
ation of employment for the workers who could have performed
the jobs.
Acceptance of the trial examiner's view would seem to make
all management decisions subject to mandatory collective bargaining,
as work opportunities are always affected by management decisions.
The Board, however, decided to heed the warning implicit in the
concurring opinion of Fibreboard by rejecting the view that all
subcontracts are required subjects of bargaining.
The Board's attitude concerning subcontracting practices has
been further revealed in Shell Oil Co.30 which was decided
immediately after Fibreboard. There, the Board indicated that it
would not compel the employer to bargain on all subcontracts.
After the labor-management contract had expired, the employer
followed his established practice of subcontracting work which
could have been performed by his employees. The union objected
although the employer abided by the wage-scale provision which
had been inserted in all prior labor-management contracts. Such
a provision was to be applied to the wages of the employees
when the employer exercised his right to subcontract. The Board
found that the employer had the right to subcontract without
bargaining with the union as long as he complied with this wage
scale provision. Since the employer's practice had become a
familiar custom, the Board concluded that the union had a right
to bargain about this established practice when the contract was
not in operation but the employer had the right to subcontract
during the negotiations.
Both the Westinghouse and the Shell Oil Co. decisions clearly
show that Fibreboard will be limited to situations where there has
been no mutual understanding, either expressed or implied, between
the parties with respect to the past subcontracting practices of the
employer. The Fibreboard decision was not meant to carve away
large areas of management prerogatives but was meant to give
recognition to the already established areas of bargaining. Indeed,
this is readily apparent from the facts of the case. The sub-
contracting involved no essential change in plant operations or
significant capital investment. It involved only a termination of
employment which had always been considered within the phrase
"conditions of employment" requiring bargaining.
There are but a limited number of subcontracts falling within
the scope of mandatory collective bargaining. Thus, the employer
30 149 N.L.R.B. No. 22 (1964) ; accord, Shell Chemical Co., 149 N.L.R.B.
No. 23 (1964).
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does not have to bargain on work contracted out which cannot be
performed by his employees. Likewise, the employer will not be
guilty of a violation of the Act by refusing to bargain if he has
formerly contracted out work in the" past, or if there is a labor-
management contract reserving to him the right to subcontract,
even if the work could be performed by his employees.
Although it is apparent that the court does not wish to ex-
tinguish management prerogatives, the employer should still place
a provision in the labor-management contract expressly reserving
such prerogatives.81 The Board will more readily reserve a subject
to management where there is a contract provision relating to it.
In doing so, the Board recognizes that the nature of a contract is
such that there is bargaining before there is agreement. Without
such provision, however, the Board's decisions on the matters sub-
ject to mandatory collective bargaining will continue to turn on the
particular facts of each case.
LIEN LAw - SEcTION 39-a - MEAsURE OF DAMAGES FOR
ExcEssIvE CLAIM LIMITED SOLELY TO A OUNT WILLFULLY
EXAGGERATED. - In a recent action to foreclose a mechanic's lien,
the defendant counterclaimed for a declaration that the lien was
void as a result of the lienor's willful exaggeration of the amount
due. In addition, .the defendant asked for damages, pursuant to
Section 39-a of the Lien Law,1 in an amount equal to the difference
between the total amount of the lien filed and the amount found
due. The lienor contended that if any damages at all were owing
to the defendant, they should include only the willfully overstated
amounts and not honest discrepancies. A divided Court of Appeals,
although declaring the lien void, nonetheless accepted the lienor's
contention as to damages and held that section 30-a was designed
to permit recovery only in the amount of willful exaggeration.
Goodman v. Del-Sa-Co. Foods, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 191, - N.E.2d -,
- N.Y.S.2d - (1965).
Prior to any statutory authority for invalidating liens which
were willfully exaggerated, a judicial practice evolved in some
courts to declare such liens void on the theory that the exaggeration
did not meet the requirements of the statement of value in the
31 Although it is advisable to include a management prerogative clause
in a contract, it seems to be established that management cannot negotiate on
this issue with a "take it or leave it' attitude. See General Elec. Co.,
150 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (1964); Shell Oil Co., supra note 30.
' N.Y. LIEN LAw § 39-a.
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